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State aid or subsidy programs are a common practice in developed and developing countries 
for supporting national companies. Despite the fact that they are strictly regulated by the 
WTO rules, BRICS countries actively apply this measure, even though they claim to adhere 
to the usual path of liberalization and trade cooperation. The aim of the paper is to reveal 
the distinguishing features of such programs in BRICS counties for trade in transport equip-
ment. Using a cross-country comparative analysis and case studies, the authors first explain 
the controversy in theoretical approaches to state aid policy analysis. They then identify the 
peculiarities of non-tariff measures applied by BRICS and the role of state aid. Finally, the 
authors present data from specific case studies in transport equipment trade. The authors 
conclude that the effectiveness of subsidies in the transport sector is not obvious, as dynamics 
of imports and exports of relevant products depends on various external factors. Neverthe-
less, the application of state aid in the industry provides national producers a more favorable 
environment. State aid programs, in most cases, do not comply with WTO regulations, which 
implies trade distortion and could provoke trade disputes. BRICS countries should strengthen 
monitoring of these programs and focus on the opportunity for applying horizontal rather 
than vertical subsidies.
Keywords: state aid, subsidy, non-tariff measures, BRICS, protectionism, foreign trade, trade 
in transport equipment.
Introduction
In the turbulent global economy, countries often use various trade policy instruments 
to protect their producers in domestic and foreign markets. The world economic crisis of 
2008–2009 influenced trade policy of both developed and developing countries and led to 
a phenomenon of “murky protectionism,” when states applied trade distortive measures 
that did not directly violate World Trade Organization (WTO) rules [Baldwin, Evenett, 
2009]. Since then, despite the international claims to facilitate trade through mutual liber-
alization, states have continued to implement more sophisticated protectionist practices. 
Leaders of BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in recent 
meetings and summits announced the need for a “transparent, non-discriminatory, open 
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416 Вестник СПбГУ. Экономика. 2018. Т. 34. Вып. 3
and inclusive multilateral trading system” as well as “standstill and rollback of protection-
ist measures” and the increase of their cooperation in this field [BRICS Leaders …, 2017]. 
Some scholars note a certain potential in promoting trade links among BRICS [Realizing 
the BRICS…, 2017]. However, the divergence in trade patterns of BRICS states has set off 
a debate about the limitations of such trade cooperation [Koval, Trofimenko, 2017; Pioch, 
2017]. Moreover, one barrier to BRICS collaboration involves diversity in applied trade 
distortive measures. BRICS states differently execute protectionist policy to protect their 
domestic economies from tough competition and adverse effects of lower tariff rates. State 
aid (subsidies) is one of the most widely used measures implemented in many areas of 
domestic manufacturing, including transport equipment [Evenett, 2015]. 
The main goal of this paper is to investigate characteristics of state aid programs of 
BRICS states using cross-country comparative analysis with sectoral case studies. The re-
search in this field usually uses country-level analysis of state aid in general or of support 
for a particular sector in a specific country. This paper contributes to existing studies by 
comparing different subsidy programs in various BRICS countries, which is less common 
in the literature. Moreover, this research will focus on trade distortions due to WTO in-
consistency about state aid programs, which provides possible insights for academic work 
as well as for policy-makers implementing subsidies and estimating their impact. 
The paper consists of the following parts. First, the theoretical review explains the 
controversy in approaches to and analyses of state aid policies and the importance of this 
study for the contemporary international trading system. Second, the paper identifies pe-
culiarities of non-tariff measures applied by BRICS and the role of state aid for trade poli-
cies. Third, the authors conduct cross-country case studies for trade in transport equip-
ment. Finally, the authors present concluding remarks. 
1. State aid as trade policy measures: theoretical background
The concept of state aid has been widely debated among scholars and considerably 
varied across countries. State aids represent a significant amount of public funds and gov-
ernments grant subsidies in a multiplicity of ways [Competition, State…, 2011]. In fact, 
according to majority of studies, state aid means the same as a subsidy and refers accord-
ingly to non-tariff measures [Ginevicius et al., 2010; Messerlin, 1999; Zahariadis, 2008]. 
The existence of the seemingly identical notions “state aid” and “subsidy” might be 
due to differences in relevant rules for the European Union (EU) and WTO. The term 
“state aid” is widely used in EU legal documents, whereas “subsidy” describes similar 
practices in WTO agreements1. The European law defines state aid as “an advantage in 
any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public 
authorities.” To be “state aid” in the meaning of EU legislation, a measure must have the 
following features: 1) There should be an intervention by the state or through state re-
sources that can take a variety of forms (e.g. grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, 
state holdings of all or part of a company, providing goods and services on preferential 
terms, etc.); 2) The intervention should provide the recipient an advantage on a selective 
basis, for example to specific companies or industry sectors, or to companies located in 
specific regions; 3) Competition should be or may be distorted; 4) Intervention is likely to 
1 The comparative analysis of juridical discrepancy for ‘state aid’ and ‘subsidy’ in the EU and the WTO 
accordingly is represented in the study by Luca Rubini [Rubini, 2009].
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affect trade between Member States [Competition, State…, 2017]. The WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) defines a subsidy as “a fi-
nancial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a WTO 
Member, involving actual or potential direct transfer of funds (e.g. grants, loans, equity 
infusions) or liabilities (loan guarantees), government revenue that is otherwise due is 
foregone or not collected, the provision of goods or services other than general infrastruc-
ture or purchases of goods, making payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusting or 
directing a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions listed above, 
providing any form of income or price support2… which operates directly or indirectly to 
increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into the terri-
tory of a WTO Member”3. 
As one can see from these definitions, state aid or subsidy is any form of public con-
tribution to private companies, and the main issue is how significantly this measure alters 
competition and trade flows between states. The focus of the WTO is more precisely on 
trade effects. A WTO Member State could challenge a trade-distorting subsidy granted by 
another Member State via the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) or could implement 
countervailing duties. However, initiation of both a dispute in the WTO or a countervail-
ing measure is costly, so in some cases Member States prefer to implement their own sub-
sidy programs in response. This can cause a chain reaction and further increases in state 
aid. One important difference is that the EU system provides both ex-ante and ex-post 
control of state aid, while the WTO assumes only ex-post control through DSM [Compe-
tition, State…, 2011]. In the EU system all subsidies should be proven by the European 
Commission, while in the WTO there is only a notification procedure. This explains why 
there is a rise of state aid programs implemented by the WTO Members (including the 
EU) to support domestic producers in the competition with foreign producers both on 
national and international markets. 
According to information from the Global Trade Alert (GTA) database — the most 
complete and comprehensive database compiling state measures from countries all over the 
globe likely to discriminate foreign commercial interests4 — state aid and bailouts5 are the 
most widely used measures worldwide (Table 1). State aid is rated first among measures al-
ready implemented and classified as red6 (third among pending measures), and are in the top 
three types of measures affecting the largest number of sectors, tariff lines, and jurisdictions.
2 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Article I // WTO. 24-scm.pdf. 229 p. Avail-
able at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf (accessed: 15.02.2018). 
3  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947, Article XVI // WTO.gatt47.pdf. Geneva, 1986. 97 p. 
Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf (accessed: 15.02.2018). 
4 The Global Trade Alert database has involved government statements made after November 2008 un-
til present time which included a credible announcement of a meaningful and unilateral change in the 
relative treatment of foreign versus domestic commercial interests. It covers 233 countries and dependent 
territories. More information on data classification and methodology in the GTA handbook: Evenett S. J., 
Fritz  J. The Global Trade Alert database handbook. Manuscript, 28.03.2018. Available at: file:///C:/Users
/%D0%A1%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%B9/Downloads/GTA%20handbook.pdf (accessed: 
15.05.2018). 
5  Bail-out means “the provision, usually by a government, of funds to a firm or to another government 
in danger of insolvency so as to prevent them from defaulting on their debt” [Deardroff, 2014]. Bail-out 
therefore is a specific type of state aid particularly applied in the period of economic crisis. 
6 Measures indicate governmental actions already taken and almost certainly discriminating against 
foreign commercial interests.
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Table 1. Trade policy measures worldwide that affect foreign trade, 2008–2016
Measure type Measures reported
Measures 
classifies 
red
Measures 
already 
implemented
Pending 
measures
Jurisdictions 
affected
Tariff 
lines 
affected
Sectors 
affected
State aid / Bail-out 2 114 1 833 1 634 480 214 729 63
Import tariff 1 981 705 1 355 626 201 457 60
Trade defense 
measure (AD, CVD, 
safeguard)
1 895 1 424 1 191 704 107 998 64
Export taxes or 
restrictions 742 371 397 345 194 1 031 69
Investment measure 618 211 531 87 170 1 205 65
Public procurement 
localization 503 396 288 215 161 49 38
Trade finance 478 405 410 68 198 211 24
Localization 
requirement 468 346 397 71 207 445 49
Non tariff barrier 
(not otherwise 
specified)
457 181 333 124 196 283 37
S o u r c e: Global Dynamics //  Global Trade Alert (GTA). 2008–2016. Available at: https://www.
globaltradealert.org/global_dynamics (accessed: 15.02.2018).
On the one hand, even though the impact of state aid has a distorting effect on com-
petition domestically and internationally [Collie, 2000], state aid is effective for increasing 
financial viability of national companies and their survival in crisis periods [Heima et 
al., 2017]. As economic and financial crises forced anti-competitive responses by govern-
ments, the recent crisis of 2008–2009 evidently catalyzed the demand for stronger state 
protection of the most vulnerable constituent parts of the economy and society to pro-
mote quicker recovery. Subsidies in this case gave more support for competing with for-
eign companies in the domestic market. 
On the other hand, subsidies are universally acknowledged to be not only a widely 
used protectionist instrument, but also an effective means to stimulate exports. Econo-
mists believe export flows (especially those to developed countries) are a universal indica-
tor reflecting competitiveness of domestically produced goods, demand in foreign mar-
kets, and conformity with international standards [Poluektov, 2015]. Statistics show that 
subsidies are widely used by governments of different countries as effective incentives for 
exports, which has become a threat to all efforts of trade liberalization to reduce the effect 
of tariff rate reductions. The way subsidies have potential to do so is through distorting 
competition. In this case, a recipient of state aid obtains benefits not granted under com-
mon market conditions [Sciskalova, Muenster, 2014]. 
Economic reasoning presupposes that subsidies can be justified only under very 
specific circumstances; nevertheless, in the majority of cases they do not rely on purely 
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economic grounds. Very often logrolling becomes the driving reason for implementing 
subsidies; in this case, the economy is unlikely to end up in a situation of efficient resource 
allocation, but it may have desirable political benefits [Houthakker, 1972]. 
It is also worth to mentioning that in some cases subsidies constitute the greatest 
part of state expenditures. They directly influence domestic resource allocation, income 
distribution, and state expenditure productivity, and reduce the flexibility of the economy, 
affecting structural and/or sectoral adjustments [Schwartz, 1999]. Governments use state 
aid to alter economic activity and and to generate employment so as to achieve an out-
come that would not otherwise appear. Subsidies may create jobs, increase productivity, 
and promote further private investment. Nevertheless, producers may be prone to mimic 
companies-in-need, for example, underinvesting in R & D — subsidizing firms that ex-
ceed an established threshold of R & D investment is one way to deal with this problem. 
The justification of state aid is compensation for market failures and market imper-
fections [Meiklejohn, 1999]. When it becomes a tool “to make use of ” rather than to “cor-
rect” market imperfections, it may improve social security at home [Abbott et al., 1987; 
Feenstra, 1986]. For instance, in the case of a market failure, the “first-best” policy to 
address a single distortion offsets the source of the distortion directly: if domestic produc-
tion of a certain good is associated with positive externalities, a production subsidy is the 
“first-best” policy, as it is welfare-superior to an import tariff [Trade and public policies…, 
2012]. The major problem is that the choice of “treatment” often depends on initial costs 
rather than on forecasts of possible net returns [Shah, 2005].
Being a non-market instrument, subsidies can hardly be called the best available pol-
icy alternative. However, due to the decrease in opportunities to use tariffs for protection-
ism in the contemporary international trading system, governments focus on state aid as 
one available non-tariff measure. In order to estimate the economic burden of subsidies 
of any kind, policymakers need to align their actions with several factors. Initially trans-
parency — the first but not the decisive factor — means quite a bit; undisclosed costs and 
benefits can hamper subsidy control and economic development connected with it. 
Second, there is empirical evidence that means-testing, categorical targeting, or self-
targeting of state-aid recipients can increase efficiency and reduce fiscal burden for citi-
zens when compared to blanket subsidies that neither target separate groups of beneficiar-
ies, nor establish any threshold values above which consumers and/or producers will not 
get state support. This preserves the effectiveness of subsidy programs [Report from the 
Commission…, 2011]. Third, policymakers must be aware of beneficiaries’ willingness to 
change their economic behavior to further obtain gains from state subsidy programs; this 
is why periodic reassessment of the efficiency of subsidies is required, along with retarget-
ing or elimination, and intensive control over costs and cost recovery. Fourth, state aid 
programs should be structured in line with states’ institutional and administrative where-
withal [Głowicka, 2008].
Governments in developed and developing countries tend to use multiple policies 
with various tariff and non-tariff instruments. The main objectives for using subsidies are 
industrial development, innovation, and support for national champions, environmental 
conservation, and redistribution [Exploring the links…, 2006]. The first mentioned refers 
to the most common goal of state aid for developing countries and emerging markets. 
BRICS states widely use subsidies in their industrial policies [Naude et al., 2015]; however, 
there is a certain lack of comparative studies in this field. 
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2. State aid in the context of BRICS trade policies: overview
BRICS trade policies are relatively diverse: they use both liberalizing and protection-
ist trade policy measures. However, the number of restrictive measures prevails over those 
that liberalize, and there are some claims that most instruments for trade liberalization 
are only temporary and that BRICS undertake more comprehensive approaches to protec-
tionism [Barone, Bendini, 2015; Evenett, 2015]. BRICS countries apply a mixed variety of 
tariff and non-tariff instruments that affect intra-BRICS trade as well [Koval, Pioch, 2017]. 
Table 2 presents the structure of the most popular trade policy measures among BRICS 
countries, as reported to the Global Trade Alert Database for the period 2008–2016. 
For the above-mentioned period, BRICS states altogether implemented 311 state aid 
programs. For all BRICS states, except India, state aid was among top five implemented 
measures; however, India enacted a substantial amount (30) of state aid programs in com-
parison with South Africa (5) or China (19). Russia applied almost 70 % of all BRICS 
subsidy programs. We suppose that such variation in the application of state aid programs 
is a function of several factors. First, it is positively correlated with the level of domestic 
production competitiveness in global markets. For instance, according to the Global Man-
ufacturing Competitiveness Index Report 2016, China secured the leading position, while 
India was 11th in the ranking; South Africa, Brazil, and Russia were 27th, 29th, and 32th 
[Global Manufacturing …, 2016]. This means that Brazil and Russia ceteris paribus need-
ed more state support for industrial development. However, such support might include 
not only state aid or similar trade measures, but also investment in improving the business 
climate, such as the legal and institution framework. A significant amount of state aid in 
Russia could be also due to its opportunity to conduct such trade policy independently 
during the world economic crisis of 2008–2009, when Russia was not yet a WTO member 
(which Russia joined in 2012). 
Table 2. Top-5 non-tariff measures affecting foreign commercial interests used by BRICS in 2008–2016
n/n  Measure Russia Brazil China South Africa India
1 State aid / bail-out 217 40 19 5 30
2 Import tariff 64 53 27 52 46
3 Export taxes or restrictions 23  – –  – –
4 Trade finance 21 – –  – 113
5 Public procurement localization 20 –  – 3 –
6 Trade defense measures (antidumping, 
countervailing, safeguard) – 90 45 23 158
7 Localization requirement – 50 – 3 120
8 Export incentive – 9 26 – 40
9 Investment measure  – – 20  – –
Note: Compiled by the authors based on the GTA Database: Countries // Global Trade Alert (GTA). 
2008–2016. Available at: https://www.globaltradealert.org/countries (accessed: 15.02.2018).
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A second factor is the government’s disposition to protectionism or liberalization. 
Although the majority of measures implemented by each BRICS state were protective, 
the balance between liberalizing and protective measures differed across these countries. 
Thus, states with the most protective trade policies were India and Russia, who applied 
28 % liberalizing and 72 % harmful measures between November 2008  and February 
2018, according to the GTA database. In the same period, Brazil liberalized trade the most 
among BRICS, as it implemented 47 % liberalizing and 53 % harmful measures. South Af-
rica and China took positions in the middle: 42 % and 40 % liberalizing, versus 58 % and 
60 % harmful measures, respectively. 
Third, if a country is not inclined to use state aid programs with further subsidies as 
defined in the WTO SCM Agreement, it uses alternative means to promote local products 
promotion in exports markets: localization requirements, export incentives, trade finance, 
and so on. For instance, Table 2 shows that Brazil, China, and India prefer trade defense 
measures, and South Africa used more tariff barriers than non-tariff policies. 
The foreign markets most affected by protective measures applied by BRICS are for 
motor vehicles and components, chemicals, metal products, and electronics. BRICS coun-
tries, especially Russia, use state aid programs most actively in trade of transport equip-
ment. According to the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS), 
transport equipment is exported and imported under these codes: 86 (Railway or tramway 
locomotives, rolling stock and parts thereof); 87  (Vehicles other than railway or tram-
way rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof); 88 (Aircraft, spacecraft, and parts 
thereof); and 89 (Ships, boats, and floating structures). The role of transport equipment 
production for BRICS manufacturing is relatively high. According to World Bank data, 
the share of transport and machinery equipment in manufacturing value added was es-
timated to be more than 25 % for China, 22 % for Brazil, 20.5 % for India, 14 % for South 
Africa, and 10.5 % for Russia7. 
In 2017, BRICS share in global export of transport equipment was estimated at 8.3 %, 
and for import at 9.3 %. China occupies the lion’s share of trade in transport equipment 
among BRICS; however, the share of these products in national export for South Africa, 
Brazil, and India was higher than for China (cf. Table 3). Russian exports of transport 
equipment accounted for only 2 % of national exports, while imports made up more than 
13.9 % of the country’s total imports. Russia demonstrated the most unbalanced trade in 
transport equipment, with a relatively high value of negative trade balance.
In general, for 2008–2016  both BRICS export and import of transport equipment 
increased, while the most significant development was motor vehicle trade (HS 87), where 
export growth was more significant than import growth. The most substantial leap in 
exports was for India. The export of motor vehicles from India increased 3.5  times for 
2008–2016, while exports from China and South Africa almost doubled. At the same time, 
it is notable that exports of the same products from Russia and Brazil slightly decreased. 
The main question is whether these changes rely on state aid programs. 
7  The World Bank presents the only database that makes it possible to compare the role of machinery 
and transport equipment for BRICS manufacturing. However, this indicator includes not only transport 
equipment, but also computing, communication, and other equipment. The latest year of measurement was 
2013. However, this still provides an overview of the significance of transport equipment sectors for BRICS 
(World Development Indicators Database // World Bank. 2013. Available at: https://data.worldbank.org/
products/wdi (accessed: 15.05.2018)).
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Table 3. BRICS trade in transport equipment in 2017 
Countries Export, USD, bln 
Share in 
national 
export,  %
Share in 
world 
export,  %
Import, 
USD, bln 
Share in 
national 
import,  %
Share in 
world 
import,  %
Brazil 20.58 9.5 1 12.76 8.5 0.5
Russia 7 2 0.4 31.8 13.9 1.7
India 16.63 7.7 0.9 12.3 3.6 0.7
China 104.9 4.6 5.4 108.1 5.9 5.9
South Africa 10.59 12 0.6 8.3 10 0.5
Note: Compiled by the authors based on the information of ITC Trade Map Database: 
Trade Map Database //  International Trade Centre. 2018. URL: https://trademap.org/Index.aspx? 
AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed: 15.05.2018).
3. Methodology
In order to compare and assess possible adverse effects of BRICS state aid programs 
on trade in transport equipment, we chose the case study method for the following rea-
sons. First, the cases provide a new perspective on a relatively underexplored subject and 
can be considered an initial step in research. Case studies allow us to conduct an in-depth 
analysis of real situations and indicate specific features of state aid programs. Second, the 
analysis of BRICS cases allows a comparative study. The contrast of cases could present 
valuable findings. Finally, the case study method involves both qualitative and quantitative 
analyses. As state aid could be provided in different forms and a variety of approaches (due 
to differences in objectives, pre-conditions, economic and political environments, etc.), 
there are constrains of sole use of quantitative methods8. Exogenous factors must also be 
included in the analysis. For example, a decision to provide subsidies to some producers 
but not others may arise not out of pure necessity of rescuing an enterprise or an industry, 
but also out of political efforts by elites or lobbying groups, or poor macroeconomic poli-
cies. Not taking such factors into account might lead to the wrong conclusions: correct 
assessment of a starting point for the implementation of a subsidy programe is crucial 
for further analysis. Therefore, the analysis of trade statistics, on the one hand, and the 
detailed study of provisions of state aid programs, on the other, will help us make certain 
assessments and recommendations. The qualitative analysis will be based on the noncon-
formity of BRICS state aid programs with WTO norms. 
Evaluating state aid requires a unified framework accepted by all analytical units (i.e. 
BRICS countries), because if there is no such framework or if it is not agreed that countries 
must conform to some uniform requirements, a researcher may come to wrong conclu-
sions. Some common rules should serve as a basis for analysis: being aware of regulations 
8 In studies of state aid provided in the European countries one may find a usage of mono method, 
e. g. quantitative one. However, the statistical and econometric analysis of the EU state aid is visible as it 
is provided in a single manner due to the common regulation. BRICS states apply different legislation and 
approaches in their subsidy programmes that complicates the analysis with a wide range of limitations. 
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that their legislation should meet, countries do better or worse adjusting their domestic 
legislation. 
We test the potential for BRICS state-aid programs to distort trade in terms of their 
consistency with WTO legislation, taking into account that there is no other commonly 
accepted legal basis to compare trade policies of BRICS states; and the WTO definition 
of “subsidies” is relevant for BRICS, as they all are WTO Members. We assume that a 
violation of any WTO Agreement has an adverse effect on trade as agreed between WTO 
members and stated in the Preamble to the Agreement GATT 1947. Because Russia ac-
ceded to the WTO in 2012, we searched for relevant state aid programs in BRICS for 
2012–20169. During the chosen period, subsidy programs for transport equipment trade 
were implemented by four out of five BRICS members, China being the exception. We 
suggest that China did not apply state aid programs because Chinese goods were already 
competitive, and so there was no need for China to use additional non-market incentives 
to improve their situation. According to Euromonitor, China accounts for 59 % of trans-
port equipment production value in Asia Pacific and remains one of the world’s growth 
drivers. Asia Pacific will outperform Western Europe and North America as the Chinese 
transport equipment industry is forecast to expand at a compound annual growth rate of 
8 % in 2016–2025 [Euromonitor…, 2018]. Bail-outs as a form of state aid for the crisis pe-
riod occurred when the necessity arose to rescue a sector or enterprise from bankruptcy; 
the Chinese economy has been stable and managed to avoid such situations in sectors of 
production with a high share of state control, which provided conditions good enough to 
keep key market players afloat. Instead of subsidizing domestic producers, the Chinese 
government imposed trade defense measures under the auspices of WTO membership, 
which seems enough for the development in this field in comparison with other BRICS 
states, such as India, which applied a variety of trade policy instruments (e.g. subsidies 
and trade defense measures). 
The choice of the state aid programs for the case studies was made according to the 
following criteria. First, the program needs to be a comprehensive, long-term project, not 
a one-use, and it should continue throughout the period 2012–2016. Second, the program 
should not be aimed at one particular region of a country, as its key objective should be 
national industrial development. 
The only programs suitable for these criteria in South Africa and India are, respective-
ly, the “Automotive Investment Scheme” and “Make in India” policies. We chose INOVAR-
Auto program for Brazil, as consultations within the WTO dispute settlement mechanism 
have already been requested by the EU and Japan, and the dispute now is under revision 
of the WTO Appealed Body. The Brazilian experience is interesting, as this dispute is one 
of few cases brought under the SCM Agreement in the transport equipment sector10.
For this period in Russia, overthirty state aid programs affecting trade in transport 
equipment were initiated. The bulk of these related to the automobile and aviation indus-
9  The data for 2017 was not still available for the analysis for all countries. 
10  From the historical perspective of BRICS trade in transport equipment, another dispute via the 
SCM Agreement was earlier initiated by the USA against China in September 2012. However, it referred 
to export subsidies (not bailouts or state aid) and other incentives for automobile and automobile parts en-
terprises in China. The dispute was resolved at the consultation stage, as China ended this type of support: 
DS450: China — Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile and Automobile-Parts Industries // World 
Trade Organization (WTO). Dispute Settlement. 20.11.2012. Available at: https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds450_e.htm (accessed: 15.05.2018). 
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tries. However, subsidies for the automobile sector were mostly short-term or recently 
implemented. Moreover, they concerned a specific type of support, for example stimulus 
measures for the automobile sector for partial coverage of R & D and testing expenses ap-
plied in January 2014, or state-supported preferential leasing schemes for the local car in-
dustry implemented in May 2015. They have not represented general-purpose programs, 
as they were applied in other BRICS states, and this would have made our comparison 
problematic. For this reason, for the Russia ’s case we have chosen the Aviation Industry 
Development 2013–2025 program, which seemed similar to state aid cases selected for 
Brazil, India, and South Africa. 
4. State aid impact on BRICS trade in transport equipment: 
case studies findings
Brazil: INOVAR-Auto program
Brazil, like other developing countries, has been concerned with boosting its industry 
through innovative and competitive production, focusing state actions on technological 
development [Pereira, 2009]. INOVAR-Auto was approved in Brazil on October 2012 by 
Law No. 12.715/2012. The main goal of this program was to create conditions for in-
creasing competitiveness in the automotive sector, producing more fuel efficient vehicles, 
and investing in the supply chain and development of technology. Support was provided 
through presumed IPI (Tax on Industrialized Products) tax credits granted to accredited 
companies or through reduced IPI tax rates on imports of vehicles originating in certain 
countries, as well as on certain domestic vehicles [Brazil — Certain Measures…, 2017]. 
The reduction of IPI tax could be up to 30 %. The duration of the program was five years, 
from 2013 to 2017. Since 2017, the reduction of IPI tax is 1–2 % for certain vehicles [IN-
OVAR-Auto, 2018].
The INOVAR-Auto program set up in Brazil seems to distort trade by providing more 
favorable treatment to domestically produced goods and goods originating from territo-
ries of some WTO members, such as Mexico and MERCOSUR11 countries, granting no 
such treatment for goods imported from other WTO members [Brazil — Certain Meas-
ures…, 2017]. One might argue that Brazil could provide more favorable treatment in the 
framework of MERCOSUR and a regional trade agreement (RTA) with Mexico; however, 
INOVAR-AUTO concerned internal taxation that was not a subject to such RTAs. 
Thus, the Brazilian program does not provide “no less favorable” treatment to WTO 
members based on the following appraisal. First, it does not immediately and uncondi-
tionally grant all advantages, privileges, or immunities, in particular tax advantages avail-
able only to vehicles imported from MERCOSUR and Mexico, in accordance with GATT 
Article I (Most Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment). Second, INOVAR-Auto imposes 
the IPI tax on imported vehicles in excess of that imposed on similar domestic products, 
and so domestically produced goods receive a higher level of protection, violating GATT 
Article III (National Treatment). Third, it provides better conditions for accreditation of 
domestically produced motor vehicles, automotive components, and tools than of those 
imported into Brazil. Finally, the program establishes criteria and requirements to benefit 
11 MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) is a customs union uniting Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. 
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from tax advantages under INOVAR-AUTO, including the requirement to perform cer-
tain manufacturing procedures in Brazil, and basing the reduction of IPI tax credits on 
the level of local content in automotive components. This essentially violates the WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). In summary, the Brazilian 
government provided a subsidy prohibited under the Article III SCM Agreement, as it was 
contingent on the use of domestic over imported components.
All these arguments were presented by the EU, which initiated a dispute against Bra-
zilian programs, including INOVAR-Auto, in 2013; Japan introduced the same claim in 
2015. In 2017 the Panel issued a report that agreed with the EU and Japan and stated that 
INOVAR-Auto was WTO-inconsistent. On September 28, 2017, Brazil claimed it would 
appeal certain legal interpretations of the panel report to the Appellate Body [DS472…, 
2018]. Thus, the dispute is still under consideration. The final decision will likely be against 
Brazil and indicate that such state aid is WTO-inconsistent and distorts trade. However, 
this decision will likely be made when the program is ended. This is a clear example of how 
WTO members can apply trade distortive subsidies for a certain period of time without 
penalties, as DSM decisions do not have a retroactive effect. 
Analyzing trade in motor vehicles (87  HS Code), we could see that Brazilian ex-
ports substantially increased in 2012–2013, although in 2013–2016  there was a fall in 
export volumes (Figure 1). Imports have also declined, more substantially than exports. 
In 2016 Brazil had a positive trade balance for the first time since the state aid program 
was initiated.
Figure 1. Brazilian 87 HS Code Commodities Trade Balance
N o t e :  Compiled by the authors based on the information of ITC Trade Map Database: Trade Map Database // 
International Trade Centre. 2018. Available at: https://trademap.org/Index.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 
(accessed: 15.02.2018).
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One could argue that such changes in trade balance are an obvious outcome of IN-
OVAR-Auto that increased competitiveness of national producers. However, this result 
may be attributed to falling domestic demand, causing falling imports [Biller, 2015], or 
to a devaluation of the Brazilian currency, making Brazilian goods less expensive and in-
creasing their competitiveness [Sambo, Godboy, 2015]. Nevertheless, some experts argue 
that INOVAR-Auto program was very promising in the development of R & D activities, 
increasing energy efficiency, and dealing with environmental issues [Mello et al., 2016]. 
Another study does not see an increase in overall R & D efforts and innovation, and high-
lights that over-investment did not increase scale efficiency and productivity level [Stur-
geon et al., 2017]. Therefore, Brazilian state aid INOVAR-Auto made its contribution to 
enhance the competitiveness of the automotive sector; however, industrial development 
was not very substantial [Pascoal et al., 2017] and other factors (for instance, an overall 
economic downturn in Brazil) played their role in trade dynamics.
Russia: Aviation Industry Development 2013–2025 program
In 2012 (revised March 31, 2017) the Ministry of Industry and Trade of the Russian 
Federation adopted a governmental strategy for the aviation industry aimed at creating 
favorable conditions to gain global competitiveness and strengthen Russia’s position on 
the world market in terms of production volumes (as the country currently is ranked third 
globally by volume of aircraft production). Among the objectives outlined in the text of 
the strategy was creating incentives for purchasing Russian-made aircraft and implement-
ing state-support measures for the industry in accordance with WTO requirements. The 
former is the major goal of one of the sub-programs, Aviation Industry Development 
2013–2025, that establishes an opportunity to obtain state aid for aircraft producers oper-
ating on the territory of the Russian Federation [Resolution of March…, 2013].
A subsidy can be granted to passenger aircraft producers to cover costs of initial 
spare part stock formation, ground support equipment provision, and aircraft personnel 
retraining. An applicant should have a license for aircraft construction, production, test-
ing, and maintenance, and not be indebted. The volume of a subsidy granted can amount 
to 0.9 of the producer’s costs of spare part stock formation, ground support equipment 
provision, and aircraft personnel retraining; the maximum volume of all the costs per one 
aircraft taken into account cannot exceed RUR 115 mln (for an aircraft with passenger 
capacity of 95–110 seats and maximum takeoff weight of 45–52 tons) or RUR 120 mln 
(for an aircraft with passenger capacity of 135–211 seats and maximum takeoff weight of 
65–80 tons). The total number of aircraft taken into consideration for a subsidy calcula-
tion cannot exceed 100 units for both the types of aircraft described above. The subsidy is 
provided once, ex post and pre-payment is not allowed. 
As clearly stated in the text of the program, subsidies can be granted to cover costs of 
aircrafts, produced on the territory of the Russian Federation not earlier than on the 1st 
of January 2015 and no later than 31st of December 2022. In fact, there have been only 
two aviation companies manufacturing aircraft of the identified capacity on Russian ter-
ritory: Sukhoi Aviation Holding Company (JSC), producing the Sukhoi Super Jet with a 
passenger capacity of 95–110 seats; and IRKUT Corporation, producing MC-21 passen-
ger aircraft with passenger capacity of 195–210 seats, both belonging to and managed by 
United Aircraft Corporation.
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At the beginning of 2017, the Vice President of United Aircraft Corporation Alexey 
Demidov said that the company’s revenue increased by almost 40 % for the previous two 
years.12 Revenue from domestic sales has decreased compared to the previous period, but 
it has been compensated by higher revenues from exports and maintenance services. Still, 
the volume of sales is not enough to cover total costs of SSJ-100 [Deliveries of SU-35…, 
2017] and is unlikely to cause any distortions in the market. 
Statistics show that Russian exports of 88 HS Code commodities have grown (Fig-
ure 2). The exports of aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof have been the only ones show-
ing growth in exports in 2012–2013 compared to other manufactured products of 86, 87, 
and 89 HS codes. Although goods falling under the 86 and 87 HS codes have been subsi-
dized as well, their exports have decreased almost three times and two times, respectively. 
At the same time, one also sees an increase in imports of aviation products, which 
caused the negative balance of payments in 2014–2015. Here it is important to mention 
that such a change in trade flows could be explained by the turbulence of the Russian econ-
omy since these years. Moreover, although the program under consideration is targeted to 
help passenger aircraft producers, we need to take into account the fact, that this industry 
is strongly connected with military aircraft construction, which is demand-driven. Such 
demand is often the result of a political decision, rather than need for a balanced market 
situation. Further, the production of such complicated products is very often customized, 
takes a long time, and sometimes involves pre-payments, post-payments, or credit pay-
ment, while trade statistics reveals physical movement of goods across the border. 
12 Here it is worth to mentioning that there are other types of support provided by Russia in this indus-
try. For instance, government procurement is one of the widely used instruments and also could affect the 
aviation development. However, as table 2 has already demonstrated, state aid plays a much more significant 
role in the Russian trade policy, that’s why it became the main focus of the research. 
Figure 2. Russian 88 HS Code Commodities Trade Balance
N o t e :  Compiled by the authors based on the information of ITC Trade Map Database: 
Trade Map Database //  International Trade Centre. 2018. Available at: https://trademap.org/Index.
aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed: 15.02.2018).
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Due to the analysis of trade statistics, one could argue that this state aid program has 
not provided the expected effect of export promotion and development of local industry. 
Nevertheless, such a situation could be connected with the overall internal financial and 
economic problems of the country and not entirely with the program conditions. There-
fore, we should say that as in the previous case, trade flows seem to be influenced by a large 
variety of external factors, although in the absence of the program under consideration, 
trade in aircraft could have had worse results. Taking into account the long-term perspec-
tive of this subsidy program, it is important to understand whether the mentioned state 
aid meets WTO rules13 and could have a trade distortion effect. 
Although the Russia’s Aviation Industry Development 2013–2025 program does not 
explicitly specify a group of enterprises or industries as potential beneficiaries of the pro-
gram, there is an implicit limitation for the enterprises mentioned above as unique pro-
ducers of these particular types of aircraft. As far as this state aid is not horizontal in nature, 
does not benefit Russian economy as a whole, and favors certain enterprises, they may be 
called specific in the WTO pursuant to Article 2.1(c) SCM Agreement. Subsidy specificity 
has great trade-distortion potential, because additional resources generated outside the 
company interfere in the market mechanism functioning, redistributing market-shares in 
favor of subsidies beneficiaries and at the expense of other players [Membership…, 2014]. 
While specific subsidies are prohibited by the WTO per se, one can argue that even 
in the absence of specificity there can be implied adverse effects on trade taking shape of 
a) material injury to the domestic industry of another WTO Member, b) nullification or 
impairment of benefits accruing directly or indirectly to other WTO Members connected 
with concessions bound under Article II GATT 1994, or c) serious prejudice to the inter-
ests of another Member of the WTO. Material injury is as a rule calculated on a case-by-
case basis only; nullification or impairment connected with concessions granted under 
Article II GATT deal with the schedules of concessions on the importation of goods. This 
is not relevant in our case, and so we will analyze the conditions under which a subsidy 
may cause serious prejudice to an industry and try to assess whether such conditions may 
arise as a result of the program implementation. 
If Russia’s trade partners producing aircraft of the described type find that: 1) the im-
ports of their product into the market of the Russian Federation is displaced or impeded, 
2) the imports of their product into the market of a third country market is displaced or 
impeded, 3) a significant price undercutting by the subsidized aircraft originating from 
Russia as compared with the price of an aircraft produced by them or significant price 
suppression, or price depression or lost sales takes place in the same market, or 4) there is 
an increase of Russia’s market share in the world market, then they could argue that this 
state aid program should be a subsidy prohibited according to the WTO. However, here 
we could see another challenge existing in the international regulation of state aid. To 
question whether the subsidy provided by one WTO Member has a trade distortion effect 
and doesn’t meet the WTO rules, another WTO Members should provide the exhaustive 
evidence that is very resource consuming. This is why, as was already mentioned, the easi-
est way to struggle with the foreign state aid is to implement one’s own. This explains the 
growing number of subsidy programs not only in BRICS states, but across the world. 
13 Russia is not a signatory to the Plurilateral agreement on trade in civil aircraft, which means that the 
analysis will not take that WTO agreement into account.
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India: “Make in India” program
“Make in India” is a recent program launched by India’s Prime Minister in 2014 as a 
part of a wider set of initiatives. The global goal of the program — a response to decline in 
India’s growth rate when the bubble of hyped emerging markets burst — is to transform 
India into a global design and manufacturing hub. “Make in India” covers a wide variety 
of sectors of the domestic economy: automobiles, automobile components, aviation, bio-
technology, chemicals, etc. As a result of the program, India expects to be ranked among 
the world’s top three growing economies and among the top five manufacturing destina-
tions by 2020 [Make in India, 2018]. 
One of the sub-programs within the National Manufacturing Policy is aimed at cre-
ating National Investment and Manufacturing Zones (NIMZ) [National Manufacturing 
Policy, 2011], conceived as industrial greenfield townships intended to promote high-class 
manufacturing activities. The central government is to cover all costs of master planning, 
improving and providing external physical infrastructure (including rail, road, ports, 
airports, and telecom), and providing institutional infrastructure for productivity, skill 
development, and the promotion of domestic and global investments. Further, purchase 
preferences will be given to units in the national investment and manufacturing zones. 
State-aid policies in automobile production and automobile components sectors are 
similar. A peculiar feature is that not only the central government and the states partici-
pate in the program as sponsors; industry and/or private sponsored research programs 
exist as well. They are granted tax exemptions in the form of a weighted tax deduction, 
concessional excise duty, as well as exemption from Basic Custom Duty (BCD) [Make in 
India, 2018]. Apart from the above-mentioned measures, some states in India offer ad-
ditional incentives for industrial projects. Incentives are in such areas as rebates in land 
cost, relaxation of stamp duty, exemption on sale or lease of  land, power tariff incentives, a 
concessional rate of interest on loans, investment subsidies/tax incentives, backward areas 
subsidies, and special incentive packages for mega projects. 
The sector has had a positive trade balance with minor fluctuations, so we can sup-
pose that incentives were provided not for the sake of rescuing of automotive industry, but 
for faster and steadier growth. Indian exports of vehicles, other than railway and tramway 
rolling stock, and parts and accessories thereof, have grown faster than anywhere else in 
the world, although the country’s share in world exports is not very high. Falling imports 
may indicate an increase in the competitiveness of domestically-produced commodities 
at home. For 2012–2016, India’s balance in trade of vehicles had significantly increased 
(Figure 3). 
The automotive industry in India has been growing for the last two years in terms 
of domestic sales (passenger vehicles by 7.24 %, overall commercial vehicles by 11.51 %), 
production (increase by 2.6 %), and exports (increase by 1.91 %). Exports in the auto-
components sector are growing at a compound average growth rate of 18 % over the last 
6 years; the auto-component industry contributed 4 % to India’s exports in the 2015–
2016 financial year [Automotive Sector…, 2016]. As the evidence suggests, there is a 
substantial increase in productivity and in both domestic trade and exports for the con-
sidered sectors, although it is difficult to estimate whether such success resulted from 
the program’s implementation alone, or was a consequence of an improving economic 
situation as a whole. 
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The majority of incentives initiated by the Indian government were justified by 
their care of the environment, and opportunities for small and medium enterprises to 
enter the market and maintain their businesses or improve R & D opportunities. India’s 
subsidy program seems to be non-actionable, i.e. it does not give a valid reason to bring 
a case to DSM, since it was given as assistance to research activities conducted by firms, 
as well as to promote adaptation of existing facilities (Article 8 SCM Agreement). It is 
recognized that government assistance is widely provided by WTO members for vari-
ous purposes, and even if such assistance may not qualify for non-actionable treatment, 
that does not restrict the ability of Members to provide such assistance. Even if subsidies 
are classified as actionable, they may have no negative effect on trade until the contrary 
is proved. 
On the one hand, “Make in India” gives incentives for investments not only from 
domestic, but also foreign companies, and stimulates the development of manufacturing 
in general [Mehta, Rajan, 2017]. There is no discrimination under MFN and NT; how-
ever, the program has certainly increased the competitiveness of the Indian manufactur-
ing sector. On the other hand, the results of industrial growth could be connected with 
the overall economic development of the country in recent years. Moreover, there is some 
skepticism about a substantial increase of production in India, as there are certain doubts 
about the existence of sufficient knowledge and a feasibility of growth in Indian automo-
bile manufacturing [Sivasundaram Anushan et al., 2016; Sinha et al., 2017]. 
Thus, “Make in India” provides horizontal incentives to stimulate more or less pro-
portionate changes throughout the whole economy. The program as a whole, if successful, 
may considerably increase competitiveness of Indian goods as well as their share in the 
world market. Therefore we view the program to be WTO consistent in general.
Figure 3. Indian 87 HS Code Commodities Trade Balance
Note: Compiled by the authors based on the information of ITC Trade Map Database: Trade 
Map Database //  International Trade Centre. 2018. Available at: https://trademap.org/Index.aspx? 
AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (accessed: 15.02.2018).
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South Africa: Automotive Investment Scheme
In 2010 the Department of Trade and Industry of the Republic of South Africa worked 
out the Automotive Investment Scheme (AIS) as an incentive for growth in the automo-
tive sector through investment in or replacement of models and components that will 
increase plant production volumes, sustain employment, and strengthen the automotive 
value chain [Automotive Investment…, 2017]. AIS provides for a non-taxable cash grant 
of 20 % of the qualifying investment value in productive assets and 25 % of the qualifying 
investment value in productive assets by component manufactures and tooling compa-
nies. An applicant must be a registered legal entity in South Africa and must undertake 
manufacturing in South Africa, and be a taxpayer in good standing. 
However, there are certain requirements for producers who can benefit from the 
program. For instance, light motor vehicle manufacturers could apply for state aid if they 
can demonstrate that they will achieve a minimum of 50,000 annual units of production 
per plant within a three year period. An additional non-taxable cash grant of 5 % may be 
made available for projects that maintain their base year employment figure throughout 
the incentive period, and achieve at least two of the following economic requirements: 
tooling; research and development in South Africa; employment creation; strengthening 
of the automotive value chain; value addition; and empowerment [Automotive Invest-
ment…, 2017]. The program also provides state aid to cover competitiveness improve-
ment costs for component manufacturers, deemed component manufacturers, and tool-
ing companies.
In general, South Africa’s automotive industry is characterized by a poor business 
environment (over-regulation, lack of transparency, lack of effective enforcement) as well 
as frequent political and economic threats. There is also a low level of local research and 
development and electricity availability, as well as high costs for installing and maintain-
ing domestic manufacturing facilities. Another challenge for the industrial development is 
unskilled labour. So far, the AIS program is limited in dealing with these issues. All these 
local problems, combined with other internal rigidities, create serious obstacles to stable 
sector development; and to make domestic producers successful in the world market, the 
government needs to overcome these problems, at least partially. 
The rate of growth of South Africa’s exports in the automotive sector is positive, 
showing results far better than the rest of the world on average. At the same time, total 
trade flows of the respective goods have fallen, meaning that the country’s role in global 
trade in 87 HS Code goods has diminished. South African export growth was lower than 
the global average for the last five years; however, imports have significantly decreased in 
recent years (Figure 4).
The ultimate goal of the program is to attract more investment into the automotive 
manufacturing sector, but as a result of high costs of entering the market and the low level 
of productivity and competitiveness, large multinational firms do not include African 
countries into their global value chains [Hoekman, 2013]. Experts argue that incentives of 
South Africa’s state aid program are insufficient for industrial development [Stein, 2013]. 
The analysis of the WTO-consistency shows, that there is no reason to believe that 
AIS may cause trade distortions, since there is no evidence that the provision of subsidies 
is contingent upon export performance or upon the use of domestic over imported goods. 
Neither do we believe that the program can cause an injury to the domestic industry of 
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any South African trade partner, or seriously prejudice the interests of any trade partner. 
Some doubt may be cast on the question of whether the program limits the number of its 
beneficiaries. Since the program requires certain production performance norms to be 
fulfilled, we suppose that these requirements could fall under the definition of “the man-
ner in which discretion has been exercised by the granting authority in the decision to 
grant a subsidy” outlined in Article 2 para 1(c) SCM Agreement. However, it seems that 
the program alone may not invoke a real threat to international trade and create unfair 
competition with the help of the used non-market mechanisms.
Table 4 presents the comparison of conducted case-studies. The vertical import-sub-
stitution subsidy (as it privileges domestic over foreign goods) presents the most substan-
tial import decline, demonstrating the increase of competitiveness of domestic producers 
on national markets. However, such a subsidy did not lead to export growth in comparison 
to other cases, which raises the question as to whether domestic producers could main-
tain competitiveness without protection in the long run. The Brazilian state aid evidently 
is WTO-inconsistent, which leads to a sufficient trade distortion effect and discontent 
by trade partners. Thus, the possibility of initiation a dispute against import-substitution 
subsidies under the WTO is high, that brings additional costs to the state.
Import decline could be also achieved by vertical specific subsidies provided by Rus-
sia and South Africa. This type of state aid is less risky, as the trade distortion effect is 
less obvious and the analysis of WTO-consistency requires more studies by affected trade 
partners. However, both Russia and South Africa provided state aid in the form of grants 
that could clearly be defined as direct subsidies. Positive changes in trade balance under 
vertical specific subsidies are also not obvious, as was demonstrated by the Russian case. 
The results of state aid implementation are highly influenced by other macroeconomic 
and institutional factors. 
Figure 4. South African 87 HS Code Commodities Trade Balance
Note: Compiled by the authors based on the information of ITC Trade Map Database: Trade Map Database // In-
ternational Trade Centre. 2018. Available at: https://trademap.org/Index.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (ac-
cessed: 15.02.2018).
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The only case that could be presented as WTO-consistent was a horizontal subsidy 
implemented by India. While this program also included tax exemption as in the Brazil-
ian case, there was no discrimination of foreign producers directly, and it also provides a 
variety of state aid measures. The trade balance was improved by both import decline and 
export growth. The Indian experience demonstrates that a more comprehensive state aid 
program, including different incentives, can have less of a trade distortion effect, while 
improving the trade balance. Further study and development of horizontal state aid could, 
on the one hand, help policy makers to introduce subsidy programs with a higher level of 
complexity. On the other hand, it will most probably make it more difficult to indicate a 
trade distortion effect and require a more comprehensive analysis of subsidies by affected 
trade partners in particular and the WTO in general. 
Conclusion
Subsidization is a macroeconomic measure that allows adjusting the economic per-
formance of an enterprise or industry to the real market situation or urgent needs of so-
ciety, but all the potential costs and benefits should be scrutinized beforehand in order to 
Table 4. BRICS state aid: comparative analysis of case studies
Country Program Sector Main instruments
Type 
of state aid
WTO 
consistency
Trade balance 
improvement
Brazil INOVAR-
Auto
87 Tax reduction 
on domestic 
goods and 
for certain 
companies 
Vertical 
Import-
substitution 
subsidy 
No Yes, due 
substantial 
import decline
Russia Aviation 
Industry 
Development 
2013–2025
88 Coverage of 
some costs 
for specific 
companies 
Vertical 
specific subsidy
No, if proved 
a serious 
prejudice to 
trade partners’ 
interests
Only slight 
effect in the 
short-run
India Make in 
India
All 
manufacturing 
sectors, 
including 87
Tax exemption, 
low loans rates, 
power tariff 
incentives, 
special support 
of R&D, 
backward areas 
and mega 
projects
Horizontal 
subsidy
Yes Yes, due to 
export increase 
and import 
decline
South 
Africa
Automotive 
Investment 
Scheme (AIS)
87 Non-taxable 
cash grants 
for specific 
companies
Vertical 
specific subsidy
No, if proved a 
material injury 
or a serious 
prejudice to 
trade partners’ 
interests
Yes due to 
import decline 
and slight 
export growth 
N o t e: Compiled by the authors on the basis of case-studies. 
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avoid sporadic creation of new market externalities. State aid are non-tariff measures often 
used by BRICS as well as other countries. 
Comparison of BRICS trade policies indicated the complex nature of this phenom-
enon, as it was influenced by a variety of internal and external factors and in line with the 
country’s foreign policy development program, obligations to its citizens, and the world 
economic community. Evidence suggests that all BRICS members actively use protection-
ist trade policies in the form of non-tariff barriers to augment the effect of tariff reductions 
undertaken as a result of WTO accession. 
The examination of several subsidy programs confirmed our hypothesis that certain 
state aid programs create a trade diversion effect on international trade in transport equip-
ment (the most obvious case was Brazil) and incentivize exports, and undermine BRICS’s 
claims to pursue trade liberalization. Although violation of WTO legislation does not nec-
essarily mean the existence of a trade diversion effect, the latter is still likely. At the same 
time, we concluded that the economic environment as a whole has no less important an 
effect: poor economic performance can hardly be overcome by a single vertical subsidy 
program. 
Under the outlined subsidy programs, state aid is provided ex-ante; governments 
would like to prevent the appearance of any critical situation in transport equipment 
manufacturing because of the sector’s high strategic importance. The conditions of state 
aid provision assume results of the programs’ potential beneficiaries’ activity, rather than 
resource allocation (except for Brazil), which implies potentially high long-term costs.
The ultimate target of initiating such state aid programs is not production growth 
alone, but also export incentive to improve competitiveness of locally produced goods 
in the global market for transportation equipment. The program initiated by the Russian 
Federation is the only one that presupposes de facto subsidization of certain enterprises, 
and it has not been all that effective at achieving export growth. Although the provision 
of horizontal subsidies (“Make in India” initiative) is praised by the international trade 
system, it incurs enormous costs and in our case resulted in increased efficiency and larger 
trade flows mainly because of the favorable environment for the sector at the outset of the 
initiative.
The modalities of participation in these programs are rather transparent, and no obvi-
ous loopholes distorting competitive participation of potential beneficiaries were revealed 
in the course of the analysis. A substantial disadvantage of all the programs is that none 
of them imvolves periodic reassessment of beneficiaries’ achievements and comparison of 
established goals with achieved results. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, authorities trying to adjust terms of state aid provision to 
their international obligations making their subsidy program as innocuous as possible 
(horizontal application of subsidies) place a heavy burden of cost coverage on society and 
risks failing to achieve initial goals. At the same time, governments oriented to satisfy 
domestic needs and neglecting international obligations are likely to achieve better results 
from targeted financial provision (vertical application of subsidies). Comparing trade di-
version and trade creation possibilities from horizontal and vertical subsidy programs 
opens a new field for future research. 
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Программы государственной помощи в странах БРИКС 
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Программы государственной помощи (субсидии) являются достаточно распростра-
ненной формой поддержки национальных компаний в  развитых и  развивающихся 
странах. Хотя эти меры строго регулируются правилами ВТО, государства БРИКС ак-
тивно их используют, несмотря на заявления о стремлениях к либерализации и тор-
говому сотрудничеству. Целью статьи является определение отличительных характе-
ристик данных программ в странах БРИКС в сфере торговли транспортным оборудо-
ванием. Методы исследования базируются на межстрановом сравнительном анализе 
и изучении отдельных кейсов. В первой части статьи авторы выделяют противоречия, 
существующие в  теоретических подходах к  анализу программ государственной по-
мощи. Вторая часть посвящена описанию особенностей применения нетарифных мер 
в странах БРИКС и роли государственной помощи. И в завершение анализа представ-
лены конкретные кейсы в  области торговли транспортным оборудованием. Авторы 
пришли к  выводу, что результативность субсидий в  транспортном секторе не столь 
очевидна, поскольку на динамику импорта и  экспорта соответствующей продукции 
влияют весьма разнообразные внешние факторы. Тем не менее применение программ 
государственной помощи приводит к созданию более благоприятных условий для на-
* Исследование выполнено при поддержке РФФИ, проект №17-02-00688  «Трансформация 
внешнеэкономической политики России в меняющихся геополитических условиях».
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циональных производителей. Данные программы в большинстве случаев не соответ-
ствуют правилам ВТО, что формирует дисбаланс в международной торговле и несет 
в себе угрозу инициирования споров. В странах БРИКС необходимо усилить монито-
ринг данных программ и обратить внимание на возможность использования прежде 
всего горизонтальных, нежели вертикальных субсидий.
Ключевые слова: государственная помощь, субсидия, нетарифные меры, БРИКС, про-
текционизм, внешняя торговля, торговля транспортным оборудованием.
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